In a report issued on March 12, the IOM panel tasked with creating a new case definition for Gulf War Illness declined to do so. This is the first time the IOM was attempting to create a disease case definition, and many ME/CFS advocates (myself included) awaited the report with much trepidation because of the clues it might hold for how the ME/CFS case definition effort would turn out. It didn’t take long for ME/CFS advocates to weigh in (see posts by Jeannette Burmeister, the CFIDS Association, and Cort Johnson). I take no comfort in this report, but I also don’t believe we are automatically doomed.
What the GWI Panel Did
The panel was tasked with reviewing the published literature and holding discussions with researchers and clinicians in order to create a new case definition for GWI (referred to as chronic multisymptom illness in the report and by the Veterans Administration) and to make a recommendation regarding the illness name. They reviewed the case definition and population studies conducted on Gulf War veterans, the largest of which included more than 19,000 subjects. They considered the published data on the symptoms and exposures reported by both deployed and non-deployed Gulf War era veterans, looking for data to support the key elements of a case definition. And they came to a startling conclusion.
The panel said they could not create a new case definition. Why? Because there isn’t enough data, or at least not enough of the right kind of data. The key paragraph is on page 96:
After a thorough discussion of that literature, the committee concluded that it was not feasible to develop a new evidence-based definition of CMI. The case-definition studies do not all consistently identify period of onset, duration, frequency, severity, exposure, exclusionary criteria, or a uniform set of symptoms. There are no clinically validated tests or measures for diagnosing CMI. Furthermore, the symptoms of CMI are not unique to Gulf War-deployed veterans although they occur in the deployed at a higher frequency and with greater severity than in nondeployed era veterans or those deployed elsewhere. . . . Thus, the committee has concluded that the available evidence is insufficient to develop a new case definition of CMI inasmuch as the data are lacking for key elements of a case definition of a symptom-defined condition, which might include, for example, onset, duration, and measures of severity.
The panel went on to identify two case definitions (CDC and Kansas) that captured the common set of symptoms identified in all the case definition studies. The CDC definition is broader because it requires fewer symptoms than the Kansas definition, and does not identify exclusionary conditions. However, the panel said that “neither definition has been sufficiently validated.” The panel recommended that the VA systematically assess the data to see if it could identify some of those missing case definition elements, and that the term CMI be replaced by “Gulf War illness.”
Speaking of ME/CFS
Perhaps it’s not surprising, given the presence of both Dr. Fred Friedberg and Dr. Suzanne Vernon on the panel, that ME/CFS is briefly discussed in the report (see pp. 26-27). The committee notes that multiple ME/CFS case definitions are in use, although without acknowledging the debate over whether it is one illness or many. After pointing out that ME/CFS diagnosis is based on patient-reported symptoms (like CMI), the committee says that the either-or debate over whether ME/CFS is a physical or mental health disorder is not useful. The report states, “The distinction between mental and physical disorders is often arbitrary, and most patients’ experiences of any illness are influenced by biologic, psychologic, and social factors.”
This is not exactly an unequivocal rejection of the psychogenic theory of GWI or ME/CFS. Personally, I am disturbed by what appears to be a change in tactics for the psychosocial school. This topic needs separate discussion, so I’ve addressed it in more detail in my post Changing Tactics.
Prognosticating
So what does this GWI report tell us about what to expect from the ME/CFS IOM study? The short answer is “not much,” but I see some cause for concern.
What bothers me about this report is that the panel felt the evidence base was insufficient to create a new case definition, and it makes me wonder about our own evidence base. It is true that GWI appear to have arisen at a specific point in time (Gulf War deployment), while ME/CFS is constantly occurring. But there are similarities between the two evidence bases, too.
First, the panel noted an important limitation of the GWI cohort studies: most of them relied on self-reporting of symptoms on questionnaires (p. 34). This potentially introduces reporting bias and recall bias. Many of the ME/CFS case definition studies rely on self-report through questionnaires, too. Our studies are much much smaller than Gulf War studies, too, weakening the evidence base even further.
Second, the panel concluded that the statistical studies reviewed in Chapter 4 (pp. 67-86) “failed to identify a cluster of people that presented with a unique syndrome.” Instead, the studies found that Gulf War veterans had more symptoms with greater severity than veterans who were not deployed to the Gulf, but that the nondeployed still reported similar symptoms. It seems to me that we may be at risk for a similar conclusion, since at least some studies have found high rates of occurrence of ME/CFS symptoms in control subjects.
Third, I was struck by the similarity between some CMI/GWI case definitions and the core symptoms of ME/CFS. For example, the CDC definition (co-authored by Fukuda in 1998, oddly enough) requires one or more symptoms from at least two of three categories: fatigue, mood/cognition, and musculoskeletal. Does this sound familiar to anyone?! There is no onset requirement, meaning that those symptoms could occur at any time in order to qualify. It seems to me that many, if not all, ME/CFS patients would meet this definition too.
Fourth, post-exertional malaise might occur in GWI. Appendix B of the report presents a combined summary of symptoms reported by veterans in the studies discussed in Chapter 3. Fatigue was reported by a median of more than 30% by Gulf War veterans. The fatigue category includes reports of “fatigue lasting 24h after exertion . . . problems with fatigue lasting more than 24 hours after having made a physical effort” (p. 116). Depending on how one defines and measures post-exertional malaise, these results could be interpreted to fit that term. ME/CFS patients experience more than fatigue after exertion; we suffer from an exacerbation of all symptoms (including immune symptoms), and “fatigue” is a completely inadequate word to describe the prostration and collapse. But will the IOM panel realize that? I think many researchers, even those working in the field, may perceive that PEM is a fatigue experience. If PEM is equated to fatigue lasting more than 24 hours after exertion – which is reported by Gulf War veterans – the argument that post-exertional malaise is unique to ME/CFS falls apart.
Finally, the report notes the elements of a symptom-based case definition, including “period of onset, duration, frequency, severity, exposure, exclusionary criteria, or a uniform set of symptoms.” Because these elements were not consistently identified (or identified at all) in the Gulf War studies, the panel could not create a new case definition. The same inconsistency appears in ME/CFS literature. Differences in onset, duration, frequency/severity, exclusionary criteria and core symptoms are found among the case definition and population studies for ME/CFS – especially if you begin by lumping CFS, ME and ME/CFS studies together.
Will They?
Some advocates are optimistic about the ME/CFS IOM panel, citing differences in the committee charge, panel composition, and inclusion of unpublished data. But I think I’ve shown that some of the deficiencies in the GWI evidence base could be applied to the ME/CFS evidence base as well.
For me, it comes down to the panel. The ME/CFS IOM panel could decide that the weaknesses in the evidence base are not as problematic, and create a definition based on what we know. We have the benefit of eight panelists who are personally and/or professional acquainted with ME/CFS, a significant improvement over the lack of GWI experts on the other panel. We simply do not know how they will view the evidence, and how effectively they will advocate with the non-ME/CFS experts.
As much as I would like to share in the optimistic confidence of some ME/CFS advocates, I don’t draw solace from the GWI report. But I also can’t conclude that we’re completely screwed. We have a different panel with a different charge. Ultimately, drawing conclusions from the GWI report is an exercise in reading tea leaves – a rather poor way of predicting the future.
Changing Tactics
Transforming the Argument
The hypothesis that ME/CFS is a mental health issue has been disproved by the data. For years, the psychosocial school has claimed that CFS patients had poor coping skills and were simply deconditioned. All we needed to do was increase our physical activity (GET) and ferret out our dysfunctional illness beliefs (CBT), and we would recover. While the PACE trial and other research has been based on this premise, we have ample data that cuts the theory off at the knees. The two-day CPET (cardiopulmonary exercise testing) results cannot be faked, and distinguish ME/CFS patients from sedentary controls. Gene expression studies have also shown a distinct pattern of response to exercise in ME/CFS patients compared with sedentary controls and patients with other illnesses. Evidence, including imaging, spinal fluid, and immunological testing, has mounted to the point where Dr. Anthony Komaroff declared that the debate over back in 2006.
But the psychosocial school has not relented and I now see a change in their tactics. Instead of insisting that the illness is psychological, they are waving their hands and saying that the psychological v. physical debate is irrelevant. I offer two recent examples:
First, there is the systematic review of ME/CFS case definitions by Brurberg, et al., which I reviewed in detail in my post Systematic Overreaching. The authors stated:
As I said in my comment on the article published on BMJ Open, “The authors presented no evidence to support their accusation that the organic disease -only position has damaged research and clinical practice. Furthermore, they completely ignored the very real and logical possibility that the reverse is true. In other words, it is equally possible that the people with vested interests in the belief that ME/CFS has psychosocial causes are unwilling to leave that position, and have damaged the research and practice for patients suffering from the disease.”
Second, the recent report on the case definition for Gulf War Illness included the following discussion of the mental v. physical debate:
As in Brurberg, et al., there is no rejection of the psychogenic theory of ME/CFS. Instead, we’re told to abandon the debate. It’s not either-or, it’s both. Let’s stop arguing about the evidence, and go with a holistic view (that still includes the psychogenic theory).
It’s A Trap
Do you see what’s happening here? The ME/CFS psychogenic school is wrong – as shown by all the data that indicates biological abnormalities that are not seen in sedentary controls or people with depression or anxiety. But instead of admitting the error, they are simply changing tactics. Now they are saying that it’s psychological AND physical, and the distinction does not matter anyway.
Contrary to this new angle on psychosocial explanations, I believe it matters a great deal whether ME/CFS (or GWI) is a mental or physical disorder. The distinction between mental and physical is not “arbitrary,” but can be drawn based on signs and symptoms. I readily admit that my emotional state and coping skills have had an impact on my experience of this disease, but I completely reject the premise that therefore the distinction between mental and physical does not matter. It does.
People with mental health issues are primarily treated by psychologists, and in ME/CFS that usually means CBT and GET. We know that GET can have serious and long-lasting negative effects on ME/CFS patients. For decades, ME/CFS patients have endured dismissal and worse because of the psychogenic view of the disease. To say the distinction does not matter is foolish, at best. The practice of medicine is structured around that duology. There are medical diseases treated by physicians, and there are psychological diseases diagnosed with the DSM-IV (soon to be DSM-V) by psychologists. In the middle are psychiatric diseases like schizophrenia which are known to be biological, but are treated in the mental health setting because the symptoms of disease are behavioral. Mental health diagnoses are treated differently by health and disability insurance. There is a difference between the physical and psychological attributions of illness: in health care, in benefits, and in social views.
If the mental-physical duology no longer applies, shouldn’t that be true of all diseases? If “patients’ experiences of any illness are influenced by biologic, psychologic, and social factors,” then I suppose we are abandoning the dichotomy in cancer, heart disease, and multiple sclerosis too? I don’t know about anyone else, but I don’t hear anyone suggesting that those diseases are psychogenic in any way. I have family members who have endured MS, cancer and heart disease. Stress can make those diseases harder to manage, and even exacerbate the underlying disease process. But no one would ever say “let’s abandon the either-or thinking and agree it’s biologic and psychologic.” No way. Those diseases are accepted as physical in origin, with implications for behavior and coping. I believe that I deserve the same respect.
Bias and Decision Making
I’ve described the psychosocial school as changing their tactics, but I don’t necessarily believe there is a smoke-filled room where a cabal of psychologists sat down and said, “We’re losing the argument so let’s use these talking points instead.” I think the shift may be the result of cognitive bias and the difficulty humans have with admitting they’re wrong.
If I am a psychologist and I’ve invested 10 or 15 years in the theory that CFS is the result of poor coping skills and deconditioning, it’s going to be hard to change my mind. Despite mounting evidence that my theory is wrong, it will be hard to let it go. An easier step is to say that I’m not completely right but also not completely wrong. It’s not either/or, it’s both.
ME/CFS patients have gone through this process themselves. When the XMRV paper was published in 2009, many patients seized on the results. We had very good reasons to do so, and at first, the science and scientists seemed to support that position. But as contrary data emerged, and hard questions were asked, some scientists and patients found it very difficult to follow that data. They continued to insist that it was XMRV, and when that was disproved they claimed it was HGRVs. And when that was disproved, they claimed the science hadn’t been done right or there was a conspiracy or there were unidentified retroviruses at work. And it was three years before Dr. Mikovits finally took the courageous step of publicly admitting her conclusions had been wrong.
Nobody likes to admit a mistake, and the more you have invested in that mistake the harder it is to admit it. The psychogenic explanation of ME/CFS is wrong, but instead of admitting the mistake, some scientists are shifting gears and saying that it’s not completely wrong because the physical-psychological divide doesn’t actually matter. They are not following the data, and they are attempting to twist the dialogue so they don’t have to admit they are wrong.
Drawing the Line
The divide matters, and I will not be drawn into a compromise view. ME/CFS is a physical disease with physical causes. My emotions are relevant to my ability to cope with this physical disease, just as emotions are relevant to coping with cancer or AIDS. But I reject any hypothesis that leaves the psychogenic view on the table. Not because I don’t want to face up to having a mental illness. Not because I want my disease to be physical. Not because I am personally prejudiced against mental illness and not because I don’t see the relevance of emotions in physical health. I reject the psychogenic hypothesis because the data is not there.
I had a happy childhood. I had a satisfying career and personal life. I enjoyed being physically active. Then I got sick. And despite my strong desire to continue in that career, that personal life, and that physical activity, I have not been able to do so for almost twenty years.
The reasons why my life was destroyed matter. The cause of that destruction matters. To say that the distinction between physical and psychological causes is arbitrary and irrelevant is to dismiss my experiences. It may save face for the psychogenic school, but it is a slap in mine. I challenge the researchers and decision makers to admit their errors, and get on with the business of finding the answers that will repair my body and my life.
This post was translated into Dutch, with my permission.